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Abstract 
 The principal democratic institutions in democracy are political 
parties. Party law plays a crucial role in institutionalizing multi-party 
politics. Institutionalization of a party system is vital for the success of 
democratic system. Unfortunately, several writers show a bleak picture 
concerning the institutionalization of African political system in general and 
the party system in particular (Lindberg, 2007; Bogaards, 2003). Given 
multiparty politics is a late comer in Ethiopia, this problem is perhaps more 
direr in Ethiopia. Observation of their structure, social base, resources, 
procedure of internal decision-making, and the like clearly show the weak 
level of institutionalization as assumed by democratic theory. Thus, they are 
less likely to fulfill their democratic functions in democracy.  Given these 
problems, strict implementation of the regulatory regimes, especially in the 
areas of internal democracy and transparency of financial management, is an 
important in step towards institutionalization. But, there should be a delicate 
balance as heavy-handed regulation at early stage of party development may 
become counterproductive (Randall, 2008: 256). 
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Introduction  
 Following the seizure of power by the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (hereafter called EPRDF) in 1991, Ethiopia 
has embarked on a dual transition, from authoritarianism to democratic 
regime and from a centralized unitary state to a federal system.  The success 
of a federal system necessitates the existence of democratic institutions to 
deliver the promises and expectations of federalism such as autonomy and 
popular participation. Political parties, as the principal democratic 
institutions of governance, are meant to institutionalize both democratization 
and the federalization process. In this sense, as assumed by the democratic 
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theory, institutionalization of a party system is indispensable for the success 
of democratic consolidation.  
 The purpose of this article is to investigate how legal and 
constitutional context governing multiparty politics is conducive with the 
principles of multiparty politics and status of party system 
institutionalization in Ethiopia in light of established theories.  It will do so 
by considering their structure, social base, resources, procedure of internal 
decision-making, and the like.  
1. Conceptual Framework: Overview 
1.1. Defining Political Parties  
 Given enormous varieties in terms of their historical evolution, 
organization, ideology, social base, and so on, defining political parties is a 
difficult task (Smith, 1996:198). However, there is a fair amount of 
consensus in respect of what political parties are and of their role in a 
democratic system (Matlosa, 2007: 19). A political party is often defined as a 
group of people organized for the purpose of winning government power 
(Thakur, 1995: 220; Heywood, 2006: 218; Mohammed Salih and Nordlund, 
2007:19). For Mohamed Salih (2003: 68-69), the concept of political party in 
full sense entails “structures, functions, substantial following, and ideology”. 
 African political parties, unlike their counterparts in West, are mostly 
ethnically organized (Mohamed Salih, 2001:4 Mohamed Salih and Nordlund, 
2007: 144). African parties are also characterized by the presence of strong 
patron-client relationship between party leadership and rank-and-file 
members (Mohamed Salih, 2001:4; Marcus and Ratsimbaharison, 2005). 
Furthermore, they are often criticised for promoting personal squabbles 
among politicians and for being undemocratic (Blondel, 1978: 6), and for 
being highly hierarchical (Mushi, 1995: 12). Note also that African political 
parties, unlike their counterparts in Europe, emerged under undemocratic 
circumstances (Mohamed Salih, 2003: 2). 
The major functions of political parties can be summarized as: 
nominating, electioneering, shaping opinion, mediating among groups 
(brokerage), managing government, and providing link between government 
and citizens (Mohammed Salih, 2003: 67; Smith, 1996: 206). Citing Randall 
(1988), Mohamed Salih pointed out four major functions of political parties: 
they endow regimes with legitimacy by providing ideologies, leadership or 
opportunities for political participation; they act as a medium for political 
recruitment, thus creating opportunities for upward social mobility; they 
provide opportunities for the formation of coalitions of powerful political 
interests to sustain government, have major influence on policies as a result 
of devising programmes, supervise policy implementation, and promote the 
political socialization or mobilization of people to undertake self-help 
activities; they provide political stability in societies that are able to absorb 
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increasing levels of political participation by the new social forces generated 
by modernization (Mohamed Salih 2001: 34; 2003: 4; Smith, 1996:199-201). 
In addition, Mohamed Salih (2003:7) notes that in competitive political 
systems parties provide ‘the connection between the party system and 
government on the one hand, and between government and society on the 
other.’ With in a context of competitive party systems, therefore, political 
parties are multifunctional institutions; they “can be put to almost any 
political or governmental purpose” (Blondel, 1969: 15). In a nutshell, ‘the 
debate is no longer whether there should be parties, but whether the party 
system should be pluralist or not’ (Doorenspleet, 2003: 169). 
1.2. The nexus between democracy and political parties 
 Competitive multiparty politics does not simply mean existence of 
many parties in a country. Adejumobi (2007: 26) notes, “There is…a need to 
make the distinction between the existence of a large number of political 
parties and a party system. The former is a situation in which there are many 
parties but no meaningful party competition; one party is dominant. The 
latter is when there is real competitive party politics and democratic 
competition…A genuine party system is marked by the existence of two or 
more independent political parties actively engaged in the competition for 
political power and with a meaningful presence in terms of electoral results”.  
Matlosa and Karume (2004: 10) classified the dominant party system as a 
system “in which despite the multi-party situation, only one party is so 
dominant that it directs the political system and is firmly in control of state 
power over a fairly long duration of time that even opposition parties make 
little if any dent on the political hegemony of a dominant ruling party”, 
quoted in Brooks (2004: 1). 
 Dolo (2006) defines opposition parties as “partisan political 
institutions that are intentionally designed to temper the ruling party’s 
excesses while still pursuing both legislative and presidential offices.” For 
Dolo (Ibid), “an authentic democracy is one where the ruling party has an 
effective opposition.”  The existence of political opposition within a 
competitive party system presents alternatives to the ruling party and, 
therefore, stimulates debate within society over ideas and policies; and 
allows society to question the actions and choices of government (Mer sel, 
2008; Tavits, 2008 ). Moreover, it is argued that countervailing forces, the 
most effective of which is existence of a strong political opposition, are 
essential to check transgression toward authoritarian tendencies and abuse of 
power by the incumbency (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999: 337), cited in Brooks 
(2004: 2). 
 The well-functioning of mature political parties is a prerequisite for 
sustainable democracy (Mohamed Salih, and Nordlund, 2007; Matlosa, 
2007; Suri, and et al, 2007; Adejumobi, 2007:20). Political parties have been 
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recognized as indispensable components of representative democracy 
(Reilly, 2008: 3; Hicken, 2008: 70). Hence their role is often taken for 
granted (Heywood, 2002: 247). Schattschneider asserted that “modern 
democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties” (1942:1), quoted in 
Brown and Bruce (2008). They are the main tool by which democracy is 
introduced and maintained in modern politics (Blondel, 1978: 5; Mersel, 
2006). Without strong political parties, politics is reduced to unlimited 
opportunism and the blatant self-serving interest of politicians who may 
derail the nation-building process and the democratic entrenchment (Marcus 
and Ratsimbaharison, 2005; Haynes, 2002: 99), or greater chance for coups 
(Hicken, 2008: 73). Therefore, students of political parties have commonly 
associated political parties with democracy itself (Thakur, 1995: 220). 
 Political parties are crucial actors in aggregating interests and 
developing competing policy proposals that provide people with a choice 
(Paye, 2007:149; Matlosa, 2007: 20; Mohamed Salih, and Nordlund, 
2007:19). Huntington notes that “the principal institutional means for 
organizing the expansion of political participation are political parties and 
the party system” (Huntington, 1968: 398). Besides, parties have roles to 
form governments, and finally, reach legislative policy agreements (Johari, 
2006: 85). Parties are also a primary channel in democratic systems for 
holding governments accountable for their performance (Fish, 2005; Reilly, 
2008: 4). Beyond these, political parties are also agents of democratic 
socialization, helping to indoctrinate democratic attitudes, thereby 
contributing to democracy-building (Scarrow, 2005: 9; Marcus and 
Ratsimbaharison, 2005). 
 However, as Mohammed Salih (2003: 71) noted, the democratic role 
of political parties is more of a possibility than a guarantee, depending on 
factors such as “stage of economic and social development, the political 
culture …” Parties in developing democracies usually failed to adequately 
play all of these roles in practice (Randall, 2008: 257). Marcus and 
Ratsimbaharison (2005) and Matlosa (2007) assert that they can even 
become an obstacle for both democratic transition and consolidation. In this 
regard, there are at least three characteristics of political party systems that 
have effects on how well a democratic government functions (Paye, 2007: 
149): (1) their level of institutionalization; (2) their degree of fragmentation; 
and (3) their degree of polarization (Mushi, 1995). Reilly (2008: 4), for 
instance, identified a range of “pathologies” that weaken parties ability to 
discharge their roles in transitional democracies: 1) they are mostly poorly 
institutionalized, with limited membership, weak policy capacity and shifting 
bases of support; 2) they are often based around narrow personal, regional or 
ethnic ties, rather than reflecting society as a whole; 3) they are typically 
organizationally thin, coming to life only at election time; 4) they have little 
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in the way of a coherent ideology; 5) they often fail to stand for any 
particular policy agenda; and 6) they are frequently unable to ensure 
disciplined collective action in parliament. 
1.3. Intraparty democracy 
 One dimension to the link between political parties and democracy is 
the political parties’ internal democracy (Mersel, 2006). Mostly, existence of 
intra-party democracy expressed in undertaking three tasks: selecting party 
candidates, selecting party leaders, and defining policy positions (Ibid, 13). 
But an alternative, and perhaps the correct, view is that: ‘a democratic 
programme cannot be advanced by an undemocratic party’ (Seyd &  
 Regarding the imperative of imposing a duty of internal democratic 
structures the difficult question is to make a distinction between what is 
considered private and public (Paye 2007: 180). There are, however, 
convincing reasons for imposing a duty of internal democratic structures on 
political parties (Mersel, 2006): first, parties represent the society and major 
component of democracy. If individuals have a right to equality and liberty 
in a democracy, they must also have these rights within the bodies that 
enable them to participate in that democracy. Second, lack of internal 
democracy may be seen as evidence of external non-democracy. Third, 
political parties that lack internal democracy might oppress and control not 
only their own members but also the general public. The fourth rationale 
focuses on collective-action problems within a party. There is the risk that 
party leadership will not be supervised at all by party members (Ibid). 
Advocates for intra-party democracy argue that parties using internally 
democratic procedures are likely to select more capable and appealing 
leaders, to have more responsive policies, and, based on the view that parties 
“practice what they preach,” using internally democratic procedures for their 
deliberation and decisions strengthen democratic culture (Scarrow, 
2005: 13). 
1.4. Political funding 
 There is an increased dependence of parties on public subsidies, 
which is seen as indication of the strengthening of the party–state linkage 
(Lars Sva sand and Widfeldt, 2000). In addition, their internal organization 
and external activities are increasingly managed by the state through public 
law (Van Biezen, 2008: 25). Thus, the increased relationship between parties 
and the state can be seen in two ways: subisides and regulation. The 
cumulative effect was that the parties become transformed into ‘public 
utilities’: While parties previously drew their legitimacy from their capacity 
to represent the key constituencies within civil society, they now justify 
themselves based on a conception of democracy that sees parties as an 
essential public good (Ibid, 27). 
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 Increased regulation of party financing is necessitated due to (Van 
Biezen, 2008: 35-36): first, direct state subsidies inevitably calls for that. 
Second, the regulation of political financing is often part of a concerted 
attempt to at least minimize illicit financial practices and to enhance the 
accountability of political parties. Moreover, parties are now seen as most 
susceptible to corruption, more than any other institution (Scarrow, 2007; 
Hislope, 2005). 
1.5. Party System Institutionalization 
 Institutionalization is the ‘process by which organizations and 
procedures acquire value and stability’ (Huntington, 1968:12). Citing 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Paye (2007: 149) notes that party systems 
can be considered to be institutionalized when: 1) patterns of interparty 
competition are relatively stable; 2) parties have fairly stable and deep bases 
of societal support; 3) parties and elections are viewed as legitimate and as 
the sole instruments for determining who governs; 4) and party organizations 
are characterized by reasonably stable rules and structures (see also 
Mohamed Salih and Nordlund, 2007: 59; Diego Achard-Luis E. Gonzalez, 
2005:29). Fluid party systems, in contrast, are characterized by: 1) instability 
in patterns of party competition as new political parties frequently enter the 
system, and existing parties exit; 2) a high degree of electoral volatility3; and 
3) political parties with weak roots in society (Hicken, 2008: 78). 
McMenamin (2008: 226) pointed out three major characteristics of an 
institutionalized party: the first characteristic is “organizational systemness”, 
implying real organization, not a mere network, or façade. Second, it 
exercises “embedded decisional autonomy”. Although it has links to society, 
it has substantial control over its own decision-making (Randall, 2008: 255). 
Third, it exhibits “value infusion”, its members do not treat it purely 
instrumentally. The continuity and success of the party are regarded as a 
good in itself. Finally, the institutionalized party has a “definite public image 
and presence” as well as a “relatively stable basis of support”. 
 Organizationally, there are two key features to define the level of 
party institutionalization: the degree to which internal decision procedures 
are formalized, and the extent to which the party has coordinated structures 
throughout its target constituency (Scarrow, 2005: 12). Organizationally 
strong parties are not subservient to the interests of ambitious leaders; they 
acquire an independent status and value of their own. Rather, politicians are 
dependent on parties for their positions and career advancement (Ibid). 
Second, institutionalization implies party structures are firmly established, 
they are territorially comprehensive, and they have resources of their own 
(Diego Achard and Luis E. Gonzalez, 2005:36). 
 According to Haynes (2002: 99) and Paye (2007: 149), under 
institutionalization party system, democracy is more sustained. For Haynes 
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(Ibid), institutionalized party system help strengthen confidence in the 
democratic process in the four ways: help moderate and channel societal 
demands in to an institutionalized environment of conflict resolution; serve 
to lengthen the time horizons of actors; prevent the dissatisfied groups from 
resorting to violence; and help to inculcate in the minds of the ordinary 
people that government is democratically accountable. In contrast, 
fragmentation complicates coalition-building and inhibits compromise on 
policy issues (Paye, 2007). This means a high level of party system 
fragmentation is detrimental to the proper functioning of democratic regimes 
(Birnir, 2008: 158; Binda and et al, 2005:15). In contrast, institutionalized 
party politics will promote moderation and mutual accommodation, and 
thereby democratic stability (Schamis, 2006; Scarrow, 2007). For 
McMenamin (2008: 227), funding regulations affect institutionalization in 
that they require a more professional administration of resources. 
Furthermore, an internally democratic party is more institutionalized because 
elections require a minimum level of organizational systemness (Scarrrow, 
2005). 
 A lack of party system institutionalization can also undermine the 
ability of the voters to hold politicians individually and collectively 
accountable in two ways (Hicken, 2008: 78): “First, when parties are short-
lived electoral alliances, when personalism trumps party label, when party 
switching is rampant, it is difficult for voters to identify who to blame or 
credit for particular outcomes. Second, even if blame can be assigned, weak 
institutionalization makes it difficult to cause electoral punishment. Another 
reason for concern is that, the combination of disillusionment with the 
uninstitutionalized system and weak party loyalties may provide 
opportunities for anti-system/anti-party politicians to rise to power (Hicken, 
2008: 79). 
2) Party law in Ethiopia   
 It could be conceived as “the body of state-based regulations that 
determine the legal status of political parties and that specify how parties 
may operate, must organize or should be funded” (Van Biezen, 2008: 30). 
For Richard Katz (2004: 2), party law: 1) determines what constitutes a 
political party, who benefits from public resources, who participates in the 
government and how; 2) regulates the types of activities that parties may 
engage in raising and spending of funds, campaign activities, party 
manifestos, etc; and 3) ensures specific forms of party organization and 
behaviour. The third form of regulation is perhaps the most controversial 
(Mersel, 2008; Scarrow, 2007), as this may interfere with the internal 
functioning of parties and impose conditions for the selection of officials, or 
constraints on the ideological content of the party programme or electoral 
manifesto (Matsola, 2007). 
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 The body of party law is derived from a series of related bodies of 
law, such as laws on political parties, political finance law, electoral law, 
campaign law, court decisions and constitutions. Note that constitution is 
usually not treated as a source of party law (Van Biezen, 2008: 30). 
Constitutions of the established liberal democracies traditionally not 
mentioned political parties (Muller, 2000), owing to the fact that earlier 
parties were not seen as key institutions for democracy, and also because 
parties were seen as private and voluntary (Biezen, 2008: 39). In contrast, the 
newer democracies prescribe the activities of political parties because of a 
legacy of the past where the parties were instrumental in the establishment 
and maintenance of authoritarian rule (Ishiyama, 2001). Owing to this, many 
of the post-communist constitutions follow a “prescription model” of party 
regulation, banning parties from advocating totalitarian methods of political 
activity, or dictating that they must be separate from the state, and regulate 
the membership of political parties (Kopecky, 1995). 
 In principle, two types of party constitutionalization can be 
distinguished (Van Biezen, 2008: 37): the first defines political parties while 
dealing with the institutions of the state or political rights. The second is the 
formal identification of parties as public institutions. For example, 
constitutions may define political parties as necessary for democracy, either 
in institutional terms (when the composition of one or more key democratic 
institutions or procedures, such as parliament or elections, is defined in terms 
of political parties) or in functional terms (when the constitution defines the 
democratic system itself, or one or more key democratic principles, such as 
electoral competition, in terms of political parties) (Ibid). 
 Two types of provisions can be identified in the Ethiopian 
Constitution. First, the constitution defines the composition of one key 
democratic institution in terms of political parties when it says, ‘A political 
party, or a coalition of political parties that has the greatest number of seats 
in the House of Peoples’ Representatives shall form the Executive and lead 
it’ (Art. 56); ‘Powers of Government shall be assumed by the political party 
or a coalition of political parties that constitutes a majority in the House of 
Peoples’ Representatives’ (Art. 73.2). Second, the Constitution enshrines key 
democratic principles, such as political participation, in terms of political 
parties when it says, ‘Every person has the right to freedom of association for 
any cause or purpose’ (Art. 31). 
 However, in contrast to the case in some countries such as Nigeria, 
the Ethiopian constitution did not “micro-manage” the activities of political 
parties. The details are left to a separate proclamation. In Ethiopia, it seems 
that the tendency to regulate parties stems from the totalitarian legacy of the 
military regime. As we will see it later, parties are subject to a host of state 
regulations and laws. These regulations range from relatively simple 
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minimum requirements for registration to more complex issue of parties’ 
source of income. 
 The body of party law in Ethiopia is provided for by a series of legal 
acts. The main ones include: 1) the Transitional Charter; 2) Proclamation No. 
46/93 (amended as Proclamation No. 573/2008); 3) Proclamation No. 64/93 
(amended as Proclamation No. 532/2007); and 4) the FDRE Constitution. 
The Charter recognized freedom of conscience, expression, and association; 
the right to engage in unrestricted political activity (Arts. 1, 2, and 13). This 
provided official recognition to the existence and operation of political 
parties. These provisions further elaborated and reaffirmed by the FDRE 
Constitution (Arts. 29, 30, 31, 38, and 39). 
 Proclamation 46/93 provided provisions governing the registration of 
political parties whereas Proclamation 64/93 covered electoral matters. 
Proclamation 46/93 dealt with many issues such as definition, formation, 
prohibited acts, documents of political parties, finance, and dissolution and 
suspension of political parties. It says that all Ethiopians above the age of 18 
can form a political party or to be member of a political party (Art. 4.1). Any 
member of a political party shall have, in accordance with the by-laws of the 
party, the right to participate in the meetings of the party, to express freely 
his views and comments, to vote and elect or be elected (Art. 28). The 
intention seems to ensure the organization of the political parties to be done 
on democratic lines. All office-bearers should be elected by members 
concerned for specified time. Membership of a political party is prohibited to 
certain public offices, namely judges, armed forces, and police force (Art. 
58). The objective here seems to keep parties separate from the institutions 
of the state. As such this reflects an important legacy of the past, in which 
the WPE was instrumental in the maintenance of very authoritarian military 
rule. But, the Proclamation did not provide clear provision for the banning of 
certain ideologies. 
 Regarding registration, the Proclamation puts certain requirements. 
True, party formation requirements vary greatly between countries. In 
Ethiopia, in order to qualify as a nationwide political party, at least 1,500 
founding members are required out of which residents of a single region 
should not exceed 40% of the total. The rest of the founding members, which 
should amount to about 15% of the total number of the founding members in 
each region, should be residents of at least four of the regions (Art. 5). To be 
registered as regional party, a political party should have at least 750 
founding members, of which more than 60 per cent of the total must be 
residents of one region (Art.6). Party registration is the responsibility of the 
National Board of Ethiopia (hereafter called the Board). When applying for 
registration political parties should submit memorandum of association of 
the party, the political program of the party, the by-laws of the party, the 
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names and addresses of the party leaders, the document signed by the 
founding members, the document showing that political party leaders are 
elected by the general assembly, and the like (Art. 8). The law also contains 
requirements as to the internal party structure and the rights and duties of 
party members such as the right to elect and to be elected to internal party 
offices (Arts.28, 29). If the Board rejects the application for registration by 
the political party, the organization can petition to the Federal High Court 
(Art. 9.10). 
 As per the proclamation, a political party shall have basic documents 
such as memorandum of association, political programme, by-laws, 
documents related to ownership, property and revenue and expenditure (Art. 
12). If a political party wishes to amend these documents, it shall notify to 
the Board. The by-laws of the political parties should include things such as 
conditions for admission of members, details of the rights and duties of 
members, details of various organs of the party and description of their 
respective functions, the manner of participation of members in the activities 
of the party (Art. 15). 
 The proclmation says that the sources of income of a political party 
are: a) membership dues collected from members; b) donations or grants by 
the Ethiopian nationals and companies in accordance with the limit to be set 
by the Board; c) the grant and support to be given by the government (Art. 
51). The law prohibits political parties from engaging in commercial and 
industrial activity (Art. 53). Accepting donation or grant from foreign 
nationals, foreign governments or foreign political party, welfare 
organizations or non-governmental organization, religious organization, 
prisoners of war, terrorist organization, government organization, etc is 
prohibited (Art.52). Parties can, up on the approval of the government or 
regional state administration, collect money from events organized on 
temporary basis.  
 The proclmation also provides that the government may give 
financial support for political parties that have representation at the Federal 
and State legislatures for conducting their day to day activity and for election 
purpose. On their part, the political parties have a duty to ensure and notify 
that the support granted by the government has been utilized properly and for 
the intended purpose (Art. 44). The support to political parties must be 
apportioned between the parties based on the proportional of their number of 
seats in federal or state houses (Art. 45). The support to the purpose of 
election for federal or state houses must take in to account the number of 
candidates nominated by the political parties, and the number of women 
candidates nominated by the political parties (Art. 45).  
 The National Electoral Board is authorized to examine the accounts 
and financial records of all the political parties and make such reports public 
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for scrutiny. The political party should submit a written report annually or 
whenever the NEB requires signed by the political leaders as to the property 
and debts of the party certified by the auditor (the report includes the source 
of income and property of the political party) (Art. 19(4)); notification of 
leading members (Art. 21); keeping documents of political parties (Art. 22). 
The auditor of political party have the right to find and examine at any time 
any documents related with the assets and properties of the political party 
(Art. 24), shall perform their respective work ethically, honestly and 
naturally (Art. 26.1). Every political party shall have the responsibility to 
prove to the Board that its expenditures are spent for its political objective 
(Art. 55). 
 According to the Proclamation, certain conditions could lead to the 
suspension and dissolution of political parties. These conditions include 
failure to notify the Board when it changes its name, emblem, leadership, 
auditor, head office, and other similar change; when a party fails to submit to 
the Board annual performance, audit, or other periodic reports; failure to take 
part in two national or regional elections; and engaging in criminal activities 
as to be determined by the courts of law. The next part of the paper will 
discuss whether or not the legal framework propmotes multiparty politics.  
The Status of party System Institutionalization in Ethiopia  
 The first major weakness of the opposition in Ethiopia is that they are 
personalistic and thus lack intraparty democracy.  Broadly, personalism 
refers to loyalty to persons rather than to impersonal ideologies, institutions, 
or rules (Scarrow, 2007). Mostly, followers of political parties in Ethiopia 
identify the leaders with the party and show their loyalty solely to the party 
leader and not to the party’s ideology. So far, only the statute of the 
Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) included recently a provision of term 
limit for the party leader. Political parties often lack standard procedures in 
candidate nominations and leadership competition. They do not conduct their 
national assembly meetings regularly and the leadership lacks transparency 
in the financial administration.   
 Despite the existence of the organogram, such as general assemblies, 
and so on, on paper, most parties are highly dominated by founders and 
leaders.  Functioning, preparation for election, merger with other par ties, etc 
are based on the interests of one or few leaders. The annual meeting of the 
general assembly is little more than window dressing. This apparent lack of 
intra-party democracy adversly affects the prospect of institutionalization in 
Ethiopia. 
 Another chronic weakness is failure to produce coherent and 
comprehensive policy alternative to the electorate. Opposition parties in 
Ethiopia simply emphasize the weaknesses of EPRDF and argue that they 
can run the government “better than the EPRDF.” This seriously undermines 
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their social base.   Lack of viable policy alternative and strong organization 
affeted their outrech and recruitment activities. This contributed for a low 
level of party membership. Most of the political parties that came in to being 
after 1991 have no roots in the society. Many of the opposition parties also 
lack proper contact with civil society organisations such as trade unions, 
labor unions, and peasants associations. Given the aforementioned host of 
weaknesses, the trend seems, especially 2005 elections, a gradual 
disconnection of the citizen from the major opposition parties.  
 Women and the youth are heavily underrepresented in the political 
profile of political parties.  Many parties have included in their programmes 
the need to address the problems of women and the youth. However, 
pledgees in this regard seems more as a public relations exercise as there are 
no concrete words done to increase women political participation in their 
respective parties.  
 Another big weakness of opposition parties is their weak resource 
capacity, both financial and human resources. It is clear that the secret 
behind the success of every political party is strong financial base. The 
inequality with the ruling party in this regard is huge. The opposition parties 
are even unable to pay for office rents. Compounding these problems is that 
the law prohibited donation or grant from foreign nationals, foreign 
government or foreign political parties, nongovernmental organizations. The 
idea is that foreign funding poses threat national sovereignty. Besides, there 
is a fear that foreign funding could also lead to the formation of the so called 
“party entrepreneurs” (i.e.individuals who establish political parties for 
business). Given the economic condition of the country, these fears are well 
founded.   
 Another problem is hostility and stark polarization between the ruling 
party and opposition parties. Within the opposition bloc, it is possible to 
present a mixed picture. They often tried to create electoral alliances to 
increase their chances of obtaining more seats. Mostly, however, they suffer 
from inter-party and intraparty conflicts.   
Conclusion  
 In the post- 1991 period, Ethiopian political landscape has witnessed 
a democratic opening.  For the first time in its history the role of political 
parties is recognized by law. Since that time the number of political parties 
has been proliferated in Ethiopia. It is clear that the federalization process 
also contributed for the consolidation of multiparty politics.  
 The success of a federal system and democracy necessitates the 
existence viable political parties. The principal democratic institutions in 
democracy are political parties. Political parties in Ethiopia have an 
indispensable role in maintaining and developing the federal system and 
ensuring the equality of nationalities and regions. Indeed, the division of 
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power at different levels of government can be equitable and fair only with 
competitive party system. Unfortunately, consideration of such important 
elements such as social base and internal organization of political parties 
indicate a bleak picture concerning the institutionalization of political system 
in general and the party system in particular.  The weak level of 
institutionalization is seriously hampers the prospect of democratic 
consolidation in Ethiopia. In practice, are not fulfilling their democratic 
functions. 
 With regard to the legal and constitutional framework, it is creates 
conducive environment for the development of multiparty politics in 
Ethiopia.  By and large, legal provisions governing multiparty politics could 
is fair, credible, and up to the standard. The problem issue, however, is these 
are not translated fully into practice. There is clear lack of credibility on the 
part of the National Election Board in the eyes of opposition parties.  
Besides, the implementation of the regulatory with regard to issues of 
internal democracy and financial matters is very weak.  For instance, the 
funds of parties are not audited from time to time and the public do not get 
information as to where parties get the funds and on what items the money 
was spent. However, taking aside the alleged intimidation of opposition 
parties by government officials and EPRDF functionaries, in reality, the 
major problem lies on political parties themselves.  
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